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Abstract. The recent results presented by Moradi et al. on AES at
CHES 2010 and Witteman et al. on square-and-multiply always RSA
exponentiation at CT-RSA 2011 have shown that collision-correlation
power analysis is able to recover the secret keys on embedded imple-
mentations. However, we noticed that the attack published last year by
Moradi et al. is not efficient on correctly first-order protected implemen-
tations. We propose in this paper improvements on collision-correlation
attacks which require less power traces than classical second-order power
analysis techniques. We present here two new methods and show in prac-
tice their real efficiency on two first-order protected AES implementa-
tions. We also mention that other symmetric embedded algorithms can
be targeted by our new techniques.
Keywords: Advanced Encryption Standard, Side Channel Analysis,
Collision, Correlation, DPA, Masking.
1 Introduction
Side-channel analysis was introduced by Kocher et al. in 1998 [9] and marks the
outbreak of this new research field in the applied cryptography area. Meanwhile,
many side-channel techniques have been published. For example Brier et al.
proposed the Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [4] which has shown to be very
efficient as it significantly reduces the number of curves needed for recovering a
secret key, and more recently the Mutual Information Analysis from Gierlichs et
al. [7] has generated a lot of interest.
Since side-channel attacks potentially concern any kind of embedded imple-
mentations of symmetric or asymmetric algorithms, it is recommended to apply
various masking countermeasures (among others) in sensitive products [1,14].
Second-order or higher-order side-channel analysis can however defeat such coun-
termeasures by combining leakages from different instants of the execution of an
algorithm and canceling the effect of a mask [12,13]. Such attacks are considered
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very difficult to implement and generally require an important number of power
curves.
A specific approach for side-channel analysis is using information leakages
to detect collisions between data manipulated in algorithms. Side-channel col-
lision attacks against a block cipher were first proposed by Schramm et al. in
2003 [19]. Their attack uses differential analysis to exploit collisions in adjacent
S-Boxes of the DES algorithm. In [18] an attack against the AES is proposed to
detect collisions in the output of the first round MixColumns. Later, Bogdanov [2]
improved this attack by looking for equal S-Boxes inputs in several AES execu-
tions. He then studied in [3] statistical techniques to detect collisions between
power curves. Two recent papers have updated the state-of-the-art by introduc-
ing correlation based collision detection: Moradi et al. [15] proposed a collision
attack to defeat an AES implementation using masked S-Boxes, while Witteman
et al. [22] applied a cross-correlation analysis to an RSA implementation using
message blinding.
In this paper, we present two collision-correlation attacks on software AES
implementations protected against first-order power analysis using masked S-Boxes
and practical results on both simulated and real power curves. Our attacks are
much more efficient and generic compared to the one presented in [15]. Moreover
we believe our techniques to be applicable to other embedded implementations
of symmetric block ciphers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
two AES first-order protected implementations targeted by our study. Then in
Section 3 we present our attacks and practical results on simulated power curves
and on a physical integrated circuit. In Section 4 we compare our technique with
second-order power analysis. Section 5 deals with the possible countermeasures
and finally we conclude this paper in Section 6.
2 Targeted Implementations
The AES Algorithm. For the sake of simplicity in this paper we focus on the
AES-128 which includes 10 rounds, each one decomposed into four functions:
AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows and MixColumns. It encrypts a 128-bit mes-
sage M = (m0, . . . ,m15) using a 128-bit secret key K = (k0, . . . , k15) and pro-
duces a 128-bit ciphertext C = (c0, . . . , c15). Note however that the techniques
presented in this paper are easily applicable to AES-192 and AES-256.
The only non-linear function of the AES is SubBytes (also referred to as
the S-Boxes S in the following) which is a substitution function defined by the
pseudo-inversion I in GF(28) and an affine transformation. In this paper, we
consider the two following solutions that have been proposed to protect this
function against first-order attacks.
2.1 Blinded Lookup Table
The first targeted implementation uses a masked substitution table as proposed
by Kocher et al. [10] and Akkar et al. [1]. This masked table S′ is defined by
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S′(xi ⊕ ui) = S(xi) ⊕ vi, with ui (resp. vi) the mask of the i-th input byte xi
(resp. output byte) of function SubBytes, xi, yi, ui, vi ∈ GF(28), 0 ≤ i ≤ 15.
This table is usually computed before the AES execution and stored in volatile
memory.
We further consider that the same masks u and v are applied on all S-Boxes
during one execution (or a round at least) of the algorithm, i.e. ui = u and
vi = v for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15. We believe that this hypothesis is realistic for embedded
security products considering that an expensive recomputation of the 256-byte
substitution table S′ is necessary for each new pair (u, v) and that the storage
of many masked tables is not conceivable in memory constrained devices.
2.2 Blinded Inversion Calculation
An alternative solution has been proposed by Oswald et al. [16] and improved
on by Canright et al. [5]. It consists in computing the inversion in GF(28) using
a multiplicative mask. To do this efficiently it is proposed to decompose the
computation using inversions in the subfield GF(24) (and possibly in GF(22)).
Such masking method is well suited for hardware implementations.
We recall some properties of the masked inversion. Let I ′ denote the masked
pseudo-inversion such that I ′(xi⊕ui) = I(xi)⊕ui. The element xi⊕ui in GF(28)
is mapped to a couple (xi,h ⊕ ui,h, xi,l ⊕ ui,l) of GF(24) such that xi ⊕ ui ∼=
(xi,h⊕ui,h)X+ (xi,l⊕ui,l). As detailed in [16] many calculations occur on these
subfield elements to compute the masked inversion of xi ⊕ ui. The exact details
of these computations can be found in [16]. Note that in these formulas neither
xi,h nor xi,l is directly inversed in GF(2
4) but the following value:
di ⊕ ui,h = x2i,h × 14⊕ (xi,h × xi,l)⊕ x2i,l ⊕ ui,h .
Then the masked inversion in GF(24) of di⊕ui,h gives d−1i ⊕ui,h and is used to
compute I ′(xi ⊕ ui).
The 16 input bytes of SubBytes are blinded using different masks ui, but
one can notice that input and output masks of the inversion stage are identical.
Therefore another threat to take into consideration is the zero value power analy-
sis. This technique has been introduced in [8] and [11], and recently implemented
on the masked inversion in [15]. Finally, note that the technique presented in
this paper also applies to the improved version of Canright et al. [5] when input
and output of the inversion are masked with the same value.
2.3 Measurements and Validation of Implementations
Curve Acquisition. We have developed software implementations on a contact
smart card using a 16-bit RISC CPU with low power consumption. Two different
methods were used to validate our attacks.
First, we used simulated curves: a proprietary tool was used to simulate
power curves based on the chip architecture and the code executed. This tool
generates ideal power consumption curves without any noise which enables to
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validate in practice the resistance of an implementation to a set of side-channel
attacks leaving aside the acquisition and signal processing problems.
Second, we used real curves: we made physical measurements on the chip
itself using a MicroPross MP100 reader and a Lecroy WavePro numerical oscil-
loscope.
First-Order Resistance Validation. Since our aim was to present techniques
able to defeat first-order protected devices, we performed the classical first-order
differential and correlation analysis on the two implementations presented above,
before testing our collision attacks.
To do so, we applied DPA and CPA on the AddRoundKey, SubBytes and
MixColumns functions at the first and the last rounds of our implementations.
We also performed detailed SPA for each input byte value using many average
curves to detect any noticeable (biased) power traces that would reveal a poten-
tial leakage. In any case no leakage were observed. We also verified that both
implementations were immune to zero value power analysis and to the attack
presented by Moradi et al.
We have thus verified that to the best of our knowledge both considered
AES implementations are resistant to known first-order attacks. Nevertheless
we present in the next section two new collision-correlation techniques which
jeopardize these implementations.
3 Description of our Attacks
In this section, we present the general principle of collision-correlation attacks
and then detail how it can be applied on the two considered AES implementa-
tions.
3.1 The Collision-Correlation Method
The principle of the attacks presented in this paper is to detect internal colli-
sions between data processed in blinded S-Boxes on the first round of an AES
execution. We demonstrate in the following that if i) we are able to detect that
the same data is processed at instants t0 and t1, and ii) the S-Boxes are blinded
such that either the same mask is applied to all message bytes or the mask is
identical at the input and the output of each S-Box, then it is possible to infer
information on the secret key with very few curves.
In the following, we will denote (Tn)0≤n≤N−1 a set of N power traces cap-
tured from a device processing N encryptions of the same message M . Then
we consider two instructions1 whose processing starts at times t0 and t1 and
denote l the number of points acquired per instruction processing. As depicted
1 In our attacks we only consider the correlation between two identical instructions,
but it may even be possible to detect that two different instructions manipulate
identical data, e.g. by spotting a data bus using EMA.
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in Fig. 1 we finally consider Θ0 = (T
n
t0)n and Θ1 = (T
n
t1)n the two series of power
consumptions segments at instants t0 and t1.
T 0
t0 t0 + l t1 t1 + l
T 1
t0 t0 + l t1 t1 + l...
TN−1
t0 t0 + l t1 t1 + l
Θ0 Θ1
Fig. 1. General description of the collision-correlation attack
Note that in practice the N power curves should start at the same instant
of the encryption and be perfectly aligned. Such conditions generally require
signal processing to be performed first. Note also that as the sampling rate is
usually such that l > 1 points are acquired per instruction, we can generalize
the definition of Θ0 and Θ1 as being series of l-sample curve segments instead
of series of single power consumption samples.
The final stage of the attack consists in applying a statistical treatment to
(Θ0, Θ1) in order to identify if the same data was involved in T
n
t0 and T
n
t1 for
0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1. Let Collision(Θ0, Θ1) denote a decision function returning
true or false depending on whether this property is presumed to be fulfilled
or not. Such a decision function would usually compare the value of a synthetic
criterion with a practically determined threshold. Possible examples of such a
criterion include the mean2 squared difference, the least squared difference with
binary or ternary voting [3], and the maximum Pearson correlation factor. As
we used this latter criterion in our study, we recall that an estimation of the
Pearson correlation factor between series of curve segments Θ0 and Θ1 at time
offset t (0 ≤ t ≤ l − 1) expressed as
ρˆΘ0,Θ1(t) =
Cov(Θ0(t), Θ1(t))
σΘ0(t)σΘ1(t)
=
N
∑
(Tnt0+tT
n
t1+t)−
∑
Tnt0+t
∑
Tnt1+t√
N
∑
(Tnt0+t)
2 − (∑Tnt0+t)2√N∑ (Tnt1+t)2 − (∑Tnt1+t)2
2 The mean being taken over the N traces as well as over the l samples.
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where summations are taken over 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, and Θi(t) = (Tnti+t)n for
i ∈ {0, 1}.
Collision(Θ0, Θ1) thus consists in comparing max0≤t≤l−1(ρˆΘ0,Θ1(t)) to a
given threshold. In our experiments a preliminary characterization of the tar-
geted device enabled us to find proper values for l and the threshold.
Note that in this collision-correlation technique we compute the correlation
factor between a set of real power consumptions Θ0 with another set of real power
consumptions Θ1, rather than with model dependent estimations. As Bogdanov
already described in [3] about binary and ternary voting techniques, an inter-
esting property of this method is that, unlike Hamming weight based CPA, our
criterion does not rely on a particular leakage model. The consequences of this
are that i) the attack is more generic and requires much less knowledge of the
targeted device, and ii) the secret S-Boxes may be attacked as well as known
ones.
As said above, correlating two instants (curve segments) on different traces
has already been applied by Moradi et al. [15] on a particular AES implementa-
tion. However they collect many traces obtained by encrypting random messages
and average them according to the value of an S-Box input byte. This results
in 28 averaged curves for each byte position, from which they try to detect
collisions between two bytes. They successfully carried out this attack on their
implementation of the Canright et al. [5] first-order protected implementation.
However as indicated by the authors their implementation presented a remain-
ing first-order leakage based on zero-value attack. We applied Moradi’s attack
to the first-order protected implementations considered in this study without
success. We thus consider that this attack is not applicable to most first-order
protected implementations. Indeed averaging different traces implies the use of
new random mask values which should spoil the influence of the unmasked data
and make the collision of intermediate values undetectable. The technique we
develop in this paper improves on Moradi’s attack in order to detect data col-
lisions by comparing two instants on a same trace and repeating it on many
executions without the destructive averaging process. In the following we detail
two applications of our attack on two different implementations.
Remark Collision based analyses are also known as cross-correlation attacks in
[22] and multiple-differential collision attacks in [3]. We prefer the term collision-
correlation attacks since cross-correlation may be ambiguous depending on the
context, and multiple-differential collision attacks seems us too generic for our
method.
3.2 Attack on the Blinded Lookup Table Implementation
First, we present an application using principle presented above on the imple-
mentation described in Section 2.1. This attack targets the execution of the first
round SubBytes function. Each 16 masked input byte x′i = xi⊕ u is substituted
by a masked output byte y′i = yi ⊕ v where y′i = S′(x′i). We try to detect when
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two SubBytes inputs (and outputs) are equal within the first AES round as
depicted on Fig. 2.
m4 ⊕ k4 ⊕ u m9 ⊕ k9 ⊕ u=
x′0 x
′
1 x
′
2 x
′
3 x
′
4 x
′
5 x
′
6 x
′
7 x
′
8 x
′
9 x
′
10 x
′
11 x
′
12 x
′
13 x
′
14 x
′
15
S′ S′ S′ S′ S′ S′ S′ S′ S′ S′ S′ S′ S′ S′ S′ S′
y′0 y
′
1 y
′
2 y
′
3 y
′
4 y
′
5 y
′
6 y
′
7 y
′
8 y
′
9 y
′
10 y
′
11 y
′
12 y
′
13 y
′
14 y
′
15
Fig. 2. Collision between the computation of two S-Boxes on bytes 4 and 9 on the
blinded lookup table implementation
Detecting a collision in the first AES round between bytes i1 and i2 yields
that xi1⊕u = xi2⊕u and considering that xi = mi⊕ki⊕u implies the following
relation of the two involved key bytes:
ki1 ⊕ ki2 = mi1 ⊕mi2 . (1)
Description. Practically, we encrypted N times the same message M and col-
lected the N traces corresponding to the first AES round. For each of the N
traces we identified the 16 instants ti corresponding to the beginning of the com-
putation S′(xi⊕u). This allowed us to extract 16 segments from each trace and
construct the series Θi used for collision-correlation as explained in Section 3.1.
Performing Collision(Θi1 , Θi2) for all the 120 possible pairs (i1, i2) yields
a set of relations (i1, i2,mi1 ⊕mi2) given by Eq. (1). By repeating this process
for several random messages M one can accumulate enough relations so that the
secret key is recovered up to a guess on one key byte.
Based on 10 000 simulations we observed that on average 59 random messages
(each one being encrypted N times) provide enough relations to retrieve the key
up to an unknown byte.
Practical Results. We present hereafter our results on both simulated and
real curves.
On simulated curves. The threshold of Collision was fixed to having at least
one point among the l points correlation curve equal to 1. Under this condition
our attack was successful for N = 16. Since a mean of 59 different messages are
required, then 16 × 59 = 944 traces are sufficient on the average for the attack
to succeed on simulated curves.
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Figures 3 and 4 show the correlation curves obtained for two different mes-
sages. Both figures present the 120 outputs of ρˆΘi1 ,Θi2 (t), i1 < i2 for each mes-
sage. The black curve on Fig. 3 corresponds to a collision found for the first
message, whereas the second message yields no collision.
-0.5
 0
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 1
 0  25  50  75  100
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Time
Fig. 3. Correlation curves obtained for a
message giving one collision (black curve)
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Time
Fig. 4. Correlation curves obtained for a
message giving no collision
On real curves. The attack was successful using N = 25 so that less than 1 500
traces allow to recover the key. Notice how few traces are needed to detect a
collision by correlation. This confirms that the collision-correlation technique is
much more efficient than classical model-based CPA which would not obtain high
correlation levels with only 25 traces. Figure 5 shows an example of a correlation
peak when an equality between two S-Box outputs occurs, while Fig. 6 shows
the correlation curve when all S-Box outputs are different.
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Fig. 5. Correlation peak on real curves
when a collision occurs (black curve)
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Fig. 6. No correlation peak occurs on real
curves when intermediate data differ
Note that in the case of real curves the threshold is slightly different. To
identify a clear relation between two S-Box outputs the correlation curve must
be greater than 0.8 in the interval [130, 160]. So only these l = 30 points must
be considered when computing Collision(Θ0, Θ1).
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Attack Improvement. The method for obtaining information about the key as
described above basically exploits collision events where a pair (i1, i2) of indices
gives a high correlation between Θi1 and Θi2 revealing the value of ki1 ⊕ ki2 .
While very informative, such collision events occur much less frequently than
non-collision ones, that is when Θi1 and Θi2 show no significant correlation
between each other. Non-collision events individually bring quite few information
– namely that ki1 ⊕ ki2 is different from mi1 ⊕mi2 – but they are so numerous
that it appears worth trying to exploit them also.
As was already noted in [6,2], the problem of solving a set of equations
involving sub-parts of the key can be formulated in terms of a labelled undirected
graph. Each vertex i represents a key byte index and the knowledge of the XOR
between two key bytes is represented by an edge (i1, i2) labelled with ki1⊕ki2 . At
the beginning the graph does not include any edges. Each time a collision occurs
between two unrelated key bytes a new edge is put on the graph and results in
the merge of two connected components into a single larger one. All key byte
values belonging to the same connected component can be derived from each
other, and the goal of the attacker is to end up with a fully connected graph.
For a given message, only 0, 1, or 2 from the 120 pairs (i1, i2) lead to collisions
in most cases. All other pairs reveal some impossible value for each ki1 ⊕ ki2 .
Gathering all the information provided by these non-collisions, for each (i1, i2)
we maintain a blacklist of impossible values for the XOR of the two key bytes3.
Given the information provided by previous messages to the current graph
and blacklists, we adaptively choose the next message in order to maximize its
usefulness which we define as the number of pairs (i1, i2) where one can expect
new information (either positive or negative) to be obtained. As a first idea we
could define the penalty of a candidate message as the number of pairs (i1, i2)
for which mi1 ⊕mi2 is already blacklisted. Obviously the chosen message should
minimize the penalty. Actually this is slightly more complex and the definition
of the penalty of a message should be refined. Indeed we must also consider cases
where the message is useful for (i1, i2) and (i1, i
′
2) – that neither mi1 ⊕mi2 nor
mi1 ⊕mi′2 are blacklisted – but the value of ki2 ⊕ ki′2 is known to be precisely
equal to mi2 ⊕mi′2 . In such a case the two usefulness opportunities brought by
the message on pairs (i1, i2) and (i1, i
′
2) would bring the same information so
that they should count for a single one and the penalty of that message must be
increased by one.
In order to find a message with minimal penalty we devised a heuristic which
works in two steps. In the first step we consider some random messages (say a
few hundred) and select the one with the lowest penalty. This first step ends
with a somewhat good candidate. Then in a second step we repeatedly attempt
to decrease further the penalty by trying small modifications on this candidate
until no more improvements occur by small modifications.
We simulated our method for adaptively choosing the messages. In these
simulations we assumed that the attacker is always able to correctly distinguish
3 Some of these blacklists must also be updated when two connected components are
merged.
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between collision and non-collision events. Based on 1 000 simulations with ran-
dom keys, we show that the key is fully recovered (up to the knowledge of one
of its bytes) with as few as 27.5 messages instead of 59 messages with the basic
method. As distinguishing between a collision and a non-collision necessitates
only 25 traces per message, a mere 700 executions would suffice to recover the
key by analysing real curves.
3.3 Attack on the Blinded Inversion Implementation
The previous attack cannot be applied to the blinded inversion implementation
described in Section 2.2 since the different S-Box input and output bytes are
masked with different values ui. However there may exist a possible leakage
leading to what we may call a Zero & One value attack.
One can notice that values 0 and 1 produce a collision between the input and
the output of the masked pseudo-inversion stage I ′ as depicted on Fig. 7. This
is due to the following properties of the pseudo-inversion:
I(0) = 0 ⇒ I ′(0⊕ ui) = 0⊕ ui
I(1) = 1 ⇒ I ′(1⊕ ui) = 1⊕ ui
0⊕ u3
x′0 x
′
1 x
′
2 x
′
3 x
′
4 x
′
15
. . .
I′ I′ I′ I′ I′ I′. . .
y′0 y
′
1 y
′
2 y
′
3 y
′
4 y
′
15
. . .
0⊕ u3
or
1⊕ u3
x′0 x
′
1 x
′
2 x
′
3 x
′
4 x
′
15
. . .
I′ I′ I′ I′ I′ I′. . .
y′0 y
′
1 y
′
2 y
′
3 y
′
4 y
′
15
. . .
1⊕ u3
Fig. 7. Collision between the input and the output on byte 3 of the blinded inversion
I ′ (values 0 and 1 lead to a collision)
The two cases leading to a collision are indistinguishable from one another.
Detecting a collision between the input and the output of a blinded inversion
gives either x′i = 0⊕ ui or x′i = 1⊕ ui which reveals a key byte except one bit:
ki = mi or ki = mi ⊕ 1 .
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Description. Assume we want to recover the 7 most significant bits of k0. For
every even byte value gwe encrypt N times a single message M with m0 = g and
collect the corresponding power consumption traces Tn,g, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1. Note
that in this attack we only need to guess the 7 most significant bits because the
least significant one is indistinguishable. Let’s denote t0 and t1 the instants when
x0 ⊕ u0 is loaded before the pseudo-inversion I, and when the result is stored
respectively. For each of the N traces we extract the two segments Tn,g[t0,t0+l−1] and
Tn,g[t1,t1+l−1] and construct the series Θ
g
0 = (T
n,g
[t0,t0+l−1])n and Θ
g
1 = (T
n,g
[t1,t1+l−1])n.
For this step of our attack it is helpful to have some experience on the targeted
implementation identify exactly where these two segments are located.
Applying the decision function Collision(Θg0 , Θ
g
1) for all the 128 possible
values g will reveal two possibilities for k0. Repeating this step for all key bytes
allows the key space to be reduced to 216 values only. Note that a trick which
allows to considerably reduce the number of traces is to encrypt the messages
Mg = (g, g, . . . , g) with all bytes equal.
Results on Simulated Curves. As for previous attack on simulated curves,
a relation is established when at least one point among the l points correlation
curve is equal to 1. The attack is successful using N = 16 curves for each key
guess. Figure 8 shows the 128 correlation curves for all possible guesses on k0.
The black curve corresponds to the correct guess for k0.
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 10  20  30  40  50  60
Co
rre
lat
ion
Time
Fig. 8. Collision-correlation curves in the pseudo-inversion of the first byte in GF(28)
The attack on this second implementation has thus been validated on simu-
lated curves. We did not acquire real curves for this implementation. Based on
what has been observed on the previous attack (successful results obtained using
simulations have led to successful results on the chip in practice), we believe that
the attack would be successful on the real chip too, using a value for N of the
same order to what was necessary for the first attack.
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4 Comparison with Second Order Analysis
In this section, we present a brief comparison between the collision-correlation
method and some known second-order attacks. Our analysis was inspired from
the recent framework introduced by Standaert et al. in [20] and refined later
in [21]. This comparison gives an overview on the efficiency of these different
second-order techniques, and highlights how much the collision-correlation anal-
ysis improves on second-order attacks.
Our analysis targets the first implementation only. We compared the collision-
correlation analysis with the second-order analysis involving the absolute differ-
ence combining function f1, the squared absolute difference combining function
f2 and the normalized product combining function f3, when using as distin-
guisher the Pearson linear correlation factor ρˆ. Note that we did not used Mutual
Information Analysis, whose results remain less efficient than the classical CPA
in practice.
For sake of simplicity, we consider that the power consumption at instant
t is the Hamming weight of the intermediate data involved in the computation
plus a centered Gaussian noise ωσ with standard deviation σ. Therefore HWn(z)
corresponds to the handling of the value z for the n-th encryption. We now define
θ0 and θ1 as:
θ0 = (HWn(S(mi ⊕ ki ⊕ u)⊕ v) + ωσ)0≤n≤N−1
θ1 = (HWn(S(mj ⊕ kj ⊕ u)⊕ v) + ωσ)0≤n≤N−1
Let gi (resp. gj) denote a guess on ki (resp. kj). We compute the estimated
values wgi,gj = HW(S(mi ⊕ gi)⊕ S(mj ⊕ gj)). Considering the N messages we
obtain the series Wgi,gj = (w
n
gi,gj )0≤n≤N−1. Using the combining function fj , the
right key bytes are obtained for the highest correlation value ρˆ(fj(θ0, θ1),Wgi,gj ).
Then as in [21] we execute many times the attack with the different com-
bining functions and calculate the success rate of each one. Figure 9 shows two
comparison graphs, one for σ = 0.75 and the other for σ = 2. Both graphs plot
the success rates on 50 runs with respect to the number of curves used.
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Fig. 9. Success rates of different simulated second-order attacks
We emphasise that in this comparison the second-order attacks are shown
in a very favorable light. Indeed the correlation model used here is exactly the
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one applied to simulate the curves. In practice an attacker would not have such
good properties.
5 Countermeasures
The attacks presented in this paper defeat first-order protected implementations.
Therefore, an obvious countermeasure would be to apply second-order masking.
To the best of our knowledge, the best solution should be the countermeasure
presented by Rivain et al. [17]. It allows the implementation of proven d-order
DPA resistant AES for any d ≥ 1.
Another countermeasure against our first attack may simply consist in ex-
ecuting the SubBytes function in a random order. Even if this method is not
theoretically perfect, it may be sufficient to practically resist to second-order at-
tacks. Considering the second implementation, we think that its main weakness
is the use of a same mask before and after each byte pseudo-inversion. If the
result is masked with a different value then the collision-correlation attack is no
longer feasible.
It is also necessary to consider that depending on the quality of the hardware
countermeasures provided by the device, these attacks can become much more
complicated in practice.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a new collision-correlation analysis method on first-order se-
cured AES implementations. We highlighted the fact that this kind of attack is
more powerful and practicable than previous second-order power analyses, and
increases the risk of these implementations being broken in practice. This con-
firms the necessity for developers to take into account how collisions of masked
data may be unsafe in cryptographic implementations. A possible countermea-
sure could be the use of second (or higher) order resistant schemes.
Though we presented practical results on software implementations, we be-
lieve that this technique may also be a threat for hardware coprocessors. There-
fore the collision-correlation threat should be taken into consideration by devel-
opers and designers during their embedded cryptographic design.
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